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Things.  Objects.  These aspects of the world have long been positioned as simply there, the 
background against which human action unfolds, the passive matter on which humans exert 
their wills, the counterpoint against which the human, the subject, the conscious, is defined.1  
Perhaps we will touch things, mould them, creating artefacts or rendering things into material 
substances, ripe for further processing and exploitation.2   We might fear the thing as the 
potential unmaking of the subject, something threatening, to be overcome by human 
ingenuity.3  On the other hand, the thing may be what makes the subject: its very 
juxtaposition to our will and agency drawing us out and provoking us to create, and invent, 
‘to extend ourselves beyond ourselves.’4  Things might draw us out or provoke us through 
engaging our senses. Their tactile, tangible presence calls us to touch them, hold them, wear, 
carry or exchange them, as well as in some cases read, hear or play (with) them.5  Objects can 
bring to life the emotions, too.6 In this sense, objects enliven us. But in these conceptions, 
objects remain at the service of the human, without agency, life or will.  They are there for 
the taking, sitting at the far end of the spectrum from the human, the agent, the subject.  
However, despite a long history of attempts in liberal western thought, it requires great effort 
to sustain and police a bright line with inertia, passivity and the object on the one side and the 
active human subject, bursting with will and intention, on the other.   
 
To begin with, analytical categories are easily revealed as just that, and at times break down 
‘spectacularly’.7  International lawyers should be only too aware that the subject is created, 
not given.  The cardinal subject of international law, the state, is accorded more agency, will 
and rights than any human being, whose historical categorisation as a ‘mere’ object, 
                                                 
1 See for eg Elizabeth Grosz, ‘The Thing’ in Architecture from the Outside: Essays on Virtual and Real Space 
(MIT Press 2001) at 167 – 183, Margaret Davies, ‘Material Subjects and Vital Objects – Prefiguring Property 
and Rights for an Entangled World’ (2016) 22(2) Australian Journal of Human Rights.  It is important to note 
that this conception of passive objects versus agentive subjects is confined largely to western, post-
Enlightenment thought, and has little purchase in many legal and philosophical systems.  See for instance the 
discussion of living stones, in John Borrows (Kegedonce) Drawing out Law, A Spirit’s Guide (University of 
Toronto Press 2010) 78.   My thanks to Daniel Joyce, Isobel Roele, Elspeth Guild, and colleagues at a Queen 
Mary departmental staff seminar for their insightful comments, and to David Sugarman for the idea that objects 
might enable a project of biography or life writing of international law.   
2 See Petra Lange-Berndt, ‘Introduction: How to Be Complicit with Materials’ in Petra Lange-Berndt (ed) 
Materiality (2015 Whitechapel Gallery/MIT Press) 12. 
3 Grosz, The Thing (n 1). 
4 Elizabeth Grosz, ‘Notes on the Thing’ in Joan Ockman, The Pragmatist Imagination: Thinking about ‘Things 
in the Making’ (2000 Princeton Architectural Press) 156.   
5 Annabel Cooper, Lachy Peterson and Angela Wanhalla (eds) The Lives of Colonial Objects (2015 Otago 
University Press), 16. 
6 See Sherry Turkle, (ed) Evocative Objects: Things We Think With (MIT Press, 2007). 
7 Davies (n 1), AJHR at 6 [pre proofs]. 
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comparable in legal position to ‘beasts, territory, ships, and the like’8 casts a long shadow 
over the discipline.  This subject – the state – is barely an object, but slips from the grasp: is it 
a fiction?9 Perhaps an assemblage of different actants, as Bruno Latour would put it,10 
including, beasts, territory, ships and human individuals?  The state, although a central 
character in the drama of international law, is the perfect example of the fact that persons and 
objects are constructed through social (including legal) processes, so that a subject or object 
only emerges as the end result of these processes.11  To ask what status, what agency, what 
life trees or the multimedia screen,12 have raises the deepest questions for international law as 
a state-centred framework, demonstrating as it does that many things – including humans -  
are multi-positioned in or by international law, and that objects and subjects move back and 
forth between categories with surprising regularity.  Uncovering these constructed object and 
subject positions can help us to see more clearly some of the techniques through which the 
dichotomy between subjects and objects is maintained in international law, and challenge the 
real-world effects that follow from it.    
 
An additional reason why a bright line between the passive object and the agentive subject is 
so difficult to maintain is because objects and things resist our categorisations and analyses of 
them, and remain always in some sense unknowable.13  They do not, it turns out, lie 
passively, waiting our ordering of them.  They have social lives, which are unruly and 
unpredictable.  They have politics.14  Their biographies can be bestsellers and page-turners.  
They speak to us of the past and future.  They seem to come alive, or at least retain the ‘bio’ 
of their biographies, like relics of the saints, they are body parts, animating and potentially 
animated. They are vibrant, agentive, vigorous, and excessive.   
 
Rather than participating in the project of drawing bright lines between the lives of objects 
and subjects, we have much to gain by dispensing with these categories.  We might, in the 
process, also learn that we have much to lose.  Some of our categories and bright lines may 
be badly needed and provide crucial protections, rights and obligations.  In either case, 
however, this investigation will enable us to see our categories, and the way they operate, 
more clearly and thus to evaluate their implications and their value more thoroughly. 
 
                                                 
8 George Manner, ‘The Object Theory of the Individual in International Law’ (1952) 43 American Journal of 
International Law 428, 429.   
9 For a debate on whether the state is a fiction, an artificial person, or a ‘person by fiction’ see David Runciman, 
‘What Kind of Person is Hobbes’s State?  A Reply to Quentin Skinner’ (2000) 8 The Journal of Political 
Philosophy 268, and Quentin Skinner, ‘Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person of the State’ (1999) 7 Journal of 
Political Philosophy 1.    
10 See Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory (OUP 2005).  See my 
further the discussion of objects as agentive or actants in ‘vibrant objects’ below.   
11 See, for example, Igor Kopytoff ‘The Cultural Biography of Things: Commoditization as Process’ in Arjun 
Appadurai (ed) The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective (CUP 1986); Bruno Latour, 
Reassembling the Social (n X), Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Construction of 
Schientific Facts (1979 Princeton UP), Michel Callon, ‘Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: the 
Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St Brieuc Bay’ (1984) 32 The Sociological Review 196. 
12 See Duvic-Paoli, ‘Trees’; Schwobel-Patel and Werner ‘Screen’ in this volume.  
13 See for instance Martin Heidegger, ‘The Thing’ in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans Albert Hofstadter 
(Harper Perennial 1971) 174 – 82; Bill Brown ‘Thing Theory’ in Things (Chicago UP 2015), Chris Witmore, in 
Leora Auslander, Amy Bentley, Leor Halevi, H. Otto Sibum, and Christopher Witmore, ‘Conversation: 
Historians and the Study of Material Culture’ (2009) American Historical Review 1355, 1383.   
14 Langdon Winner, ‘Do Artifacts Have Politics?’ in The Whale and the Reactor: a Search for Limits in an Age 
of High Technology (1986 University of Chicago Press).   
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First, fixing the object as our frame of reference can have a profound impact on the way we 
are able to think about international law.  Taking the object as the starting point does not just 
provide us with a different port of departure, it opens up a whole new mode of travel.  To 
describe what we experience on this journey we might need to use different language or 
forms of description, different metaphors or imagery.  We might need to travel more slowly, 
or more quickly, since the life of an object might unfold over millennia, or might be over in a 
nano-second.  We can inhabit the time frame of an object on this journey, without allowing 
our human timescales to dominate.  At the same time we would need to pay attention to the 
way we travel through shared spaces with objects: spaces that are often more intimate and 
close to home than the global horizons towards which international law so often turns its 
ambitions.  They might be the spaces within cells in our bodies, where a virus replicates,15 
though they might also be the immeasurable – though not immaterial – space between 
ourselves and our digital selves.16   
 
As these two examples suggest, a second way that fixing the object as our frame of reference 
and treating it seriously as our subject animates international law is by making us think 
concretely about international law’s operation in the world.  As Jane Bennett notes, ‘material 
denotes some stable or rock-bottom reality, something adamantine.’17  An object seems to offer 
a material tangibility that speaks to fact; to be a ‘small, tough explosion of exactitude’.18 And 
while objects are slipperier and less easily pinned down than some might hope, taking the 
object as the primary frame of reference compels us to bring our abstract thinking, our focus 
on rules, doctrines and principles, down to the material level where their impacts are felt on 
and in communities, homes, and bodies.   
 
Third, unless we dispense with analytical categories, we may quite literally, be unable to see.  
Our frames may blot out or elide pieces of the world, even as they help us to organise and 
order our experiences.  As Latour has demonstrated, ‘the very act of perception is constituted 
by social forces,’ and we sometimes need to break free of those forces to perceive things 
which were already there, waiting for us to discover.19  Rejecting or suspending our use of 
bright lines and clear categories, and insistently asking again how and why something is an 
object, rather than a subject; alive rather than dead; an actant rather than merely passive, itself 
adds to the vitality, and to the continued relevance, of international law as something itself 
acting in an on the world. 
 
In this chapter, I offer three ways that we might consider the lives of objects, materials, or 
things.20  My purpose is not to prescribe any one reading, but to open up various ways of 
thinking of the lives of objects.  Accordingly, I draw on a range of theories, methodologies 
and insights that engage with the lives of objects, things and materials.  Some of these ways 
of understanding objects are not easily reconciled, and may even be irreconcilable, but each 
offers a fresh perspective on objects, and by extension, on international law’s objects, and 
international law itself. 
 
                                                 
15 See Murphy, this volume.   
16 Data, this volume.   
17 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Duke, 2010) 58.  Emphasis in original. 
18 Edmund de Waal The Hare with the Amber Eyes: A Hidden Inheritance (Vintage 2011) 16.   
19 Latour, Laboratory Life (n 11) 33.  
20 ‘Objects’, ‘things’ and ‘materials’ have each been rigorously theorised as philosophical or theoretical terms.  
In this chapter, I use them interchangeably, in an untheorized everyday sense, though where it is important to 
distinguish between them in specific instances I do so. 
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I start with everyday lives – the way that law and its objects are caught up with and woven 
into our daily existences, drawing on ethnographic conceptions of the lived experience of 
law.  Second, I consider the social lives of objects and biographical approaches to the lives of 
things.  Here, I make reference to anthropological ideas, museum studies and history, as well 
as ‘life writing’ and biography.  Third, I consider objects as vibrant, agentive, actants, 
drawing on ideas from Actor-Network-Theory and science and technology studies, thing 




The Everyday Lives of Objects 
 
 
The objects of international law animate international law, connect it with peoples’ 
experiences and existence.  They refute the thesis that international law is remote, situated far 
away and high above the everyday realities of daily life.21  If we regard international law as 
something material, and materially implicated in the world, the Somali Pirate skiff becomes 
more than an object that shows something about the law of the sea.  The tiny, tinny craft, 
pulled up on a wide, sandy beach makes modern piracy not a just remote and unknowable 
terror, but an act of desperation and economic rationality in the context of human precarity.22  
Railway clocks bring to life a race to control time, space and information that seems, at first 
blush, intangible, but which is revealed as deeply embedded in bucolic English village clock-
towers and laid down in the relentless onward march of railway lines across the prairies of the 
United States and Canada.23    
 
These objects demonstrate that law is alive at least in the sense that, as Ewick and Silbey 
write, it ‘has a commonplace materiality, pervading the here and now of our social 
landscape.’24  It is ‘an emergent feature of social relations rather than an external apparatus 
acting upon social life.’25 In this way, law ‘embodies the diversity of the situations out of 
which it emerges and that it helps structure.’26  It is alive in the sense that our lived 
experience is full of law, even when we do not see or acknowledge it.   
 
There is law in the objects and things around us: a ‘dolphin safe’ tuna tin is not only full of 
tuna and brine, but of legal rules, institutions and controversies.27  There are also material 
objects in our laws: at the minutest level, the corporeality of data reminds us that even the 
most apparently ephemeral and incorporeal aspects in this world are, in fact, material.28 
Political and scientific controversy over the substance and properties of glyphosate 
                                                 
21 See also on this point, and the role of objects in exposing its limitations, Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja, 
‘Beyond the (Post)Colonial: TWAIL and the Everyday Life of International Law’ (2012) 45 Journal of Law and 
Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America – Verfassung und Recht in Übersee, 195.   
22 Guilfoyle, this volume. 
23 Gordon, this volume.   
24 Patricia Ewick and Susan S Silbey, The Common Place of Law: Stories from Everyday Life (1998 U Chicago 
Press) 16.  See further on law and everyday life Austin Sarat and Thomas R Kearns, (eds) Law in Everyday Life 
(Michigan UP 1995). 
25 Ewick and Silbey (n 25) 17.    
26 Ibid.   
27 See Lang this volume.   
28 Humphreys (n x). 
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demonstrate that law and the object are often mutually brought to life in the process of their 
interactions.29  
 
These examples demonstrate that international law is not just, as Pahuja and Eslava have 
written, ‘an ideological project that has material consequences’ but also ‘a material project in 
itself’.30  In its ‘creation or enclosure of spaces, administrative procedures and the use and 
constitution of particular bodies and objects, international law acquires (or attempts to 
acquire) an effective presence in our everyday life.’31  That is, international law both 
‘”creates” and “takes place” through the very materiality of the world’.32   
 
In its tangibility, an object can connect international law to the people it, quite literally, 
touches.  Look around you, and it is hard not to find objects in which law has a life, and laws 
in which objects are deeply enmeshed.  Yet lawyers can be accused of spending a good deal 
of our time killing off law, trapping it in weighty books (along with the remains of the 
occasional fly that flew too slowly).  We separate it out from life.  We frame off aspects of 
the law, and isolate them from their relationship to people, to justice, to ethics, to politics, to 
rightness and wrongness.  We place law in splendid analytical isolation.   
 
As a result, perhaps, international law is often presented as something remote, cold and 
impersonal.  It either exists only in tome-like textbooks, just so many words on so many 
pages, or it ‘happens’ when leaders shake hands at international conferences, far away and 
high above the lives of ordinary people.  International lawyers and legal theorists have done 
significant work to sustain the concept of international law as rarefied, specialised and of 
relevance only to a particular few.  For example, the ‘object theory’ of international law 
insists that only states can be subjects of international law, and that other entities, including 
individual persons, are ‘mere objects.’33  Or, as Eslava and Pahuja note, Hans Kelsen and his 
strict adherents’ commitment to an international law that is ‘permanently exceptional and 
above the quotidian realities of the nation-state’.34 Such theories resist efforts to understand 
international law as deeply implicated in the living social fabric of individuals and 
communities.  Of course many international lawyers and scholars would strongly resist the 
suggestion that international law remains the preserve of states, and are acutely aware of the 
transformative power of international law.  We need only think of human rights scholars and 
practitioners, international trade lawyers, the legal staff of international organisations, or 
international environmental lawyers to identify a corpus of people busily engaged in trying to 
bring international law to bear on everyday life. 
 
Thus the view of international law as merely top down, state controlled, and impacting only 
on a thin crust of the earth cannot now, if it ever could, be sustained.  Recent work has 
demonstrated not only that international law is tightly enmeshed in the national, local and the 
everyday, but moreover, that material objects carry international law with them into the 
neighbourhoods, living rooms, even bodies, of individuals.35  When Helmut Aust 
                                                 
29 Arcuri, this volume. 
30 Eslava and Pahuja (n 21) 202. 
31 Ibid 214 - 215.   
32 Ibid 203.   
33 Manner, (n 8) 429.   
34 Eslava and Pahuja (n 21) 215 – 16.  See also Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (2nd ed Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston 1966). 
35 See, for example, Yoriko Otomo, ‘The Gentle Cannibal: The Rise and Fall of Lawful Milk’ (2014) 40 
Australian Feminist Law Journal 215; Ann Stewart, Gender, Law and Justice in a Global Market (CUP 2011) 
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encountered the ‘Be a Neighbour’ poster on Peachtree Street in Atlanta, Georgia in 2015, he 
identified in it the multiple ways that city authorities are seeking to mould inhabitants, so that 
their daily lives reflect particular international and global norms – many of which 
international law enshrines or enforces – about who and what a ‘good urban citizen’ is.  Co-
opted into this project are urban infrastructure, small business owners, performances of caring 
and neighbourliness, even the ‘right’ way to dispose of disposable income.36 
 
Recent world events, too – from the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union in 
June 2016, to a spate of threatened withdrawals from the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court in 2017, to the election of Donald Trump in the United States in November 
2016 – put paid to the idea that international law is not also recognised and felt as deeply 
implicated in peoples’ lives.  In these examples, that impact is perceived by many as negative 
and, consequently, rejected.  For very practical reasons, thus, it is imperative that 
international lawyers recognise that international law is very much alive in everyday life.    
 
Moreover, we need to take responsibility for the fact that our own projects to insert 
international law into new arenas of domestic, regional and global politics or trade for 
instance also change everyday life on the ground – sometimes in unwelcome ways.  That is, 
when international lawyers play with law, we also play with objects, and in playing with 
objects, we play with lives.  This is not to say that international lawyers ‘play God’ for we 
enjoy no privileged position above the action.  Rather, we too are objects and subjects, whose 
lives are touched by the quotidian operation of international law, even as we also seek to 




Biographies, Histories and Social Lives  
 
 
Things, like people, have social lives.37 They move through time and space, changing hands, 
sometimes changing form, and changing fortune.  If we are interested in these things for their 
own sake, or driven by an inquiry into what things say about us, we nonetheless need, as 
Appadurai writes, ‘to follow the things themselves, for their meanings are inscribed in their 
forms, their uses, their trajectories.’38  As a method for analysing the social world, ‘“things-in-
motion” are what illuminate their human and social context.’39     
 
We can chart the way objects change, their encounters with other objects and with people, their 
brushes with fame, slow demise, and spectacular rehabilitation.  We can, to put it simply, write 
biographies of objects. We can use them to tell their own histories and to reveal their secret 
lives.  We can, for instance, follow the life of a deerskin or a collection of Japanese miniature 
sculptures, or tell the story of the potato.40  Framing our analyses around objects can offer ways 
                                                 
Ch 7; Luis Eslava, Local Space Global Life: The Everyday Operation of International Law and Development 
(CUP 2015); Eslava and Pahuja (n 21).  
36 Aust, this volume. 
37 Arjun Appadurai ‘Introduction: Commodities and The Politics of Value’ in Arjun Appadurai (ed) The Social 
Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective (CUP 1988) 3. 
38 ibid, 5. 
39 ibid.  See also Boris Arvatov, (trans. Christina Kiaer) ‘Everyday Life and the Culture of the Thing’ (1997) 81 
October 119, 124. 
40 See, respectively, Jessica Yirush Stern, The Lives in Objects: Native Americans, British Colonists, and 
Cultures of Labor and Exchange in the Southeast (University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 149 – 153, tracing 
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to decentre and deflate the ‘distended’ human being, whose centrality in so many historical and 
biographical narratives often obscures or blots out a fuller, more nuanced picture of the world.41   
 
In addition to narrating the biographies and life histories of objects, we can tell other (life) 
histories through them: the lives of Jane Austen or Russian Constructivist textile designers for 
example;42 the history of the world, of design, and of Germany.43  In international relations, 
things in motion, and as catalysts, have been used to consider how ‘the international’ is given 
life and meaning.44  Taking a legal perspective, scholars have considered the part played by 
hedges in the enclosure movement; 45 by items of shipwreck in the making of property, 
hierarchy, and economic community in mediaeval England;46 and by the material design of 
money in the making of the modern world.47   
 
Objects can also speak of times, places and people who otherwise remain silent, particularly 
those who have not left written history.48  We can turn to objects and their explanatory force 
when humans decline or seem unable to reveal their life histories to us.49  And in doing so, we 
can see that sometimes, people and objects are ‘so deeply intertwined’ that we cannot tell the 
story of a person without the story of her deeply valued objects, and vice versa.50 
 
In considering the social biographies of objects, it becomes clear that when people and objects 
interact, these interactions create meaning.51  Igor Kopytoff has argued that a biographical 
approach to objects reveals not only that meaning is created when objects and people come into 
contact, but this methodology illuminates the fact that societies constrain the world of people 
and of things, ‘constructing objects as they construct people.’52  Objects are not just there, inert 
and passive, but brought into being and given meaning through the same social processes that 
human beings are. 
 
If it turns out that objects and people are constructed in the same way through social 
processes, we must be alert to the fact that biographies go through a number of further layers 
of construction.  ‘A life’ for the purposes of biography is a literary creation, shaped by the 
                                                 
the life of a deerskin; de Waal, (n 18); Larry Zuckerman The Potato (1999 Macmillan). Gerry Simpson, in this 
volume, also cites a biography of Britain’s Ordnance Survey Maps: Rachel Hewitt, Map of a Nation: A 
Biography of the Ordnance Survey (Granta 2010).   
41 Sergei Tret’iakov, ‘The Biography of the Object (2006) 118 October 57, 61.   
42 See Paula Byrne, The Real Jane Austen: A Life in Small Things (William Collins 2013); Christina Kiaer, ‘The 
Russian Constructivist Flapper Dress’ in Bill Brown ed Things (U Chicago Press 2004). See also Gosden and 
Marshall ‘The Cultural Biography of Objects’ (1999) 31(2) World Archaeology 169; Kopytoff (n 11); Janet 
Hoskins, Biographical Objects: How Things Tell the Story of Peoples’ Lives (1998 Routledge). 
43 See Neil MacGregor, (ed) A History of the World in 100 Objects (Allen Lane 2010). Grace Lees-Maffei (ed) 
Iconic Designs: 50 Stories about 50 Things (Bloomsbury 2014); Neil MacGregor, Germany: Memories of a 
Nation (Penguin 2016). 
44 See Mark B Salter (ed) Making Things International I: Circuits and Motion (U Minnesota Press 2015); Mark 
B Salter (ed) Making Things International II: Catalysts and Reactions (U Minnesota Press 2016). 
45 Nicolas Blomley, ‘Making Private Property: Enclosure, Common Right and the Work of Hedges’ (2007) 18 
Rural History 1. 
46 Tom Johnson, ‘Medieval Law and Materiality: Shipwrecks, Finders, and Property on the Suffolk Coast, ca. 
1380 – 1410’ (2015) American Historical Review 407. 
47 Christine Desan, Making Money: Coin, Currency and the Coming of Capitalism (OUP 2014). 
48 Anabel Cooper, Lachy Peterson and Angela Wanhalla, ‘Introduction: A Scheme of Things’ in Cooper, 
Peterson and Wanhalla (n 5) 14. 
49 See Janet Hoskins (n 42) 1; Leora Auslander AHR Conversations, (n 13) 1357.   
50 Hoskins, ibid at 1 – 2. 
51 Gosden and Marshall, (n 42) 169.   
52 Kopytoff (n 11) 90. 
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necessities of plot and structure.53 Order must be imposed, and choices must be made by the 
biographer.  Details must be made to stand out, but a process of ‘smoothing’ is inevitable, as 
the rough edges of contradictions, hesitations, and other possibilities are sanded away by the 
biographer.54  Biographies, thus, are not complete, unified wholes but are instead ‘made up of 
contested objects – relics, testimonies, versions, correspondences, the unverifiable.’55  They 
‘take us into a realm of evidential and interpretive uncertainty.’56   
 
Biographies might, therefore, tell us as much about the author as about their subject (or 
object, as the case may be).  Certainly, this collection of objects reveals much about the 
preoccupations of (academic) international lawyers at the present moment in time.  Some 
objects reflect concerns and controversies raised by new technologies or phenomena, for 
instance the armed drone, data, or commoditised carbon dioxide.57  Some chapters use objects 
to reflect anew on the old themes of international law: sovereignty and territory emerging as 
prominent themes.58  Some authors show us how objects we think of as irrelevant to 
international law, such as ships’ ballast, might actually be central to its history and 
development.59   
 
In this sense, the objects selected in this project tell us something about their authors, and the 
authors’ conception of international law itself.  We glean not only disciplinary, but also 
personal, insights (our own subjectivity emerging through the objects) even if only in an 
oblique and tantalising manner.  Of course, the collection of objects here also says a lot about 
the editors.  We selected the papers from the proposals, we invited certain people to 
contribute, and through our editorial comments on both words and images we have helped 
shape the chapters themselves.60  Taken as a whole, the collection of objects says something 
greater than the sum of its parts because it reveals patterns of attention (and inattention) on 
behalf of academic international lawyers and as such, in some sense, reveals at the least a 
glimpse of those lawyers themselves and of their – our – attempts to shape the discipline or 
the practice of international law in the world. 
 
Paying heed to the patterns of attention and inattention traced above, as well as to the 
justifications advanced for an object being either central to or outside of the confines of 
international law, allows us to interrogate what international law seeks to do in the world, 
how it maintains its boundaries, and what it claims and disclaims in order to do so.  It thus 
requires us to consider the politics of international law’s objects, and how they are caught up 
in, but also themselves, motivate projects in and around international law.   
 
Turning from writing the lives of objects in international law, we can shift register and ask 
whether it would be possible to write the life of a body of law, or of a discipline?  Could objects 
                                                 
53 Cynthia Ozick, Art and Ardor (Alfred A. Knopf 1968).   
54 Hermione Lee, Body Parts: Essays on Life-Writing (Chatto and Windus 2005) 13.  On the methodological 
challenges and issues raised by histories of material culture see ‘Conversation: Historians and the Study of 
Material Culture’ (n 13) 1355.  
55 Lee (n 54) 6.   
56 David Sugarman, ‘From Legal Biography to Legal Life Writing: Broadening Conceptions of Legal History 
and Socio-Legal Scholarship’ (2015) 42 Journal of Law and Society 7, 15. 
57 Kalpouzos Armed Drone, Humphreys (n 16), Julia Dehm C02, respectively.   
58 See for instance, on sovereignty and territory: Smith, Western Sahara Boundary Marker; Hohmann, Opium, 
Lixinksi Axum Stele, Rayfuse Russian Flag at the North Pole, Aalberts Sovereign Mark of the Roi Ne-
Do’ucoula, King of Boma; Francois Finck, Border Check Point, Moldovan Republic of Transnistria. 
59 Buckner Innis, this volume.   
60 See further Joyce, this volume.   
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be used to create a biography of international law, just as they have been used to write a 
biography of Jane Austen, and if objects were employed in this way, what would they show?   
 
The first problem we face in writing the life of international law is that international law is 
not alive in the same way that a person is alive, and this remains the case even if we embrace 
the most radical theses of the agency of objects, discussed below.   The first question is, thus, 
in what sense would we understand the ‘bio’ of ‘bio’graphy here? This, it turns out, is not a 
simple question.  Even in the natural sciences, the question of what has life – and to what 
extent – is unsettled.61  We have already noted that the ‘bio’ of biography cannot be regarded 
as an unmediated reflection of a biological existence.  Nor is what counts as ‘life’ 
uncomplicated in the realm of political thought: ‘a life’62, ‘bare life’63, the question over the 
beginning and end of life, and the consequences of the answer motivate sharp debates – many 
of which echo in international law and in estimations of its potential and limitations.  But in 
these theories, the ‘bio’ signifies an organism, not a discipline, a set of institutions, or an idea 
at work in the world. 
 
International law does not have a ‘life’ as a singular entity in the same way an individual (or 
an individual organism) has.  Instead, international law (even if we can call it a single entity) 
has hundreds of lives in that it interacts in myriad ways with countless individuals across time 
and in multiple geographic locations.  Each of these interactions could be traced, and in doing 
so, we would come up with millions of different lives of international law.  Moreover, each 
individual ‘life’ would still be open to the problems inherent in conventional biography 
centred on the human such as tensions between inclusion and exclusion, issues of perspective 
and interpretation.  Attempting to write the life of international law would be both an 
impossible task as a matter of practice, and a monumental exercise of ego.  
 
More modestly, and perhaps more interestingly, international law’s objects can also be seen 
like ‘body parts’.  Although not strictly alive, in this sense, the body part would retain the 
‘bio’ of biography – the ‘DNA’ of the discipline and body of law.  Body parts can hint at the 
whole, and they can tell us much when they become mythologised and imbued with 
mysticism.   
 
For instance, a Barcelona Traction share operates, for the international law fraternity, like a 
‘secret handshake.’64  Like the relics of the Saints, the share helps us commune with our own 
high priests, the judges of the International Court of Justice.  And, as Fontanelli and Bianco 
note, the frisson of excitement at the sight, or touch, of the share is elicited only for those 
already indoctrinated to the faith.65  Understanding and accessing the power and meaning of 
the share marks out the territory of our own identities as international law professionals, as 
well as operating as an icon of our discipline.   
 
                                                 
61 See, for instance, the question of viruses: Ed Rybicki, ‘The Classification of Organisms at the Edge of Life; or 
Problems with Virus Systematics’ (1990) 86 South African Journal of Science 182; Melissa Autumn White, 
‘Virus’ in Mark B. Salter (ed) Making Things International I: Circuits and Motion (U Minnesota Press 2015). 
62 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Immanence A Life’ in Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life (2nd ed Zone Books 2005). See 
further the discussion in Jane Bennet (n 17) 53 – 55, 57, 61. 
63 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen) (Meridian 
1995). 
64 Barcelona Traction Share (this vol) at x.   
65  Ibid x.   
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And who would not call to mind the frontispiece of Hobbes’ Leviathan at this point?66  Here, 
the state, the prime subject of international law, is embodied and alive.  The state has a 
‘mystical body’ made of many human lives (the multitude) both past and future and is thus 
‘legally immortal’.67  But how is the state materialised out of these body parts?  As David 
Runciman asks, out of what, and where, is the state materialised?:  
 
Notwithstanding the frontispiece of Leviathan, the multitude are not transformed into a 
tangible entity.  But nor can the person of the state be identified with what is tangible about a 
civil society, such as its territory, or religion, or language, or history …  [T]he state must have 
a presence in the real world, but because there is nothing in that world with which it can be 
identified, it is a particularly delicate presence on which to rest such a substantial political 
philosophy.68   
 
If the subjects of the state prove delicate and insubstantial, what role might the sovereign 
objects, rather than subjects, of Leviathan play in materialising the state?  In the frontispiece 
to Leviathan, the body parts of the state are not only human forms: the state is also 
personified through arms and symbols of authority, specifically, the crown, sword, and 
crosier.  It is not only out of the plurality of human subjects that the state emerges, but also in 
these objects and symbols that authority, even sovereignty, reside.  Peter Stallybrass and Ann 
Rosalind Jones have shown how the sovereign’s objects, such as rings and gloves, once 
functioned as bodily organs.  These objects-cum body parts could be transferred from the 
monarch to the subject, and in the transfer, ‘materialized the power of people to be condensed 
and absorbed into things and of things to become persons.’69  Land, too, powerfully 
objectified sovereign power: as Stallybrass and Jones further note, ‘[w]hat did it mean in the 
Renaissance to be a monarch or an aristocrat if not to be powerfully objectified as land, both 
imagined and material?’  Shakespeare’s Bolingbroke, they note, ‘can scarcely sustain his 
name as Duke of Lancaster without the things that support that name’: the trees of the parks 
and forests of Lancaster.70 
 
‘The state’ as a construct of objects and subjects emerges as a living, sovereign entity given 
life by and through objects, able to transfer power through and into objects, and in doing so, 
to animate and be animated by them.  In tracing histories, biographies and social lives of the 
state, the lines between the human person, the personified state and objects/body 
parts/organs, resist attempts to categorise the human as active agent, and the object as passive 
foil. This suggests the generative potential in biographies or histories that begin with and take 
the object seriously, as they can illuminate how our lives are entangled in, even given life 




Vital Objects  
 
 
                                                 
66 The frontispiece of Hobbes Leviathan was designed by the artist Abraham Bosse.  Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 
or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil (Yale UP 2010 (first published 
1651)). 
67 See Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study of Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton UP 
1997 first pub 1957) 309.   
68 Runciman (n 9) 274.   
69 Peter Stallybrass and Ann Rosalind Jones, ‘Fetishizing the Glove in Renaissance Europe’ in Bill Brown (ed) 
Things (U Chicago Press 2004) 176.   
70 ibid 175 - 176. 
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In his Social Life of Things, Arjun Appadurai is quick to note that a social life of things is ‘a 
conceit’ and that it is a ‘formal truth that things have no meanings apart from those human 
beings endow them with,’71 dismissing the idea of the thing as having its own life, or of being 
alive in more than a metaphorical sense.  However, he has written elsewhere, and more 
recently, that objecthood is a mere respite:  ‘In some ways, all things are congealed moments 
in a longer social trajectory.  All things are brief deposits of this or that property, photographs 
that conceal the reality of the motion from which their objecthood is a momentary respite.’72  
We can still the social lives of objects, hold them momentarily in abeyance but, as Appadurai 
notes here, things have a tendency to burst out from these frames, and assert themselves.  We 
turn now to consider these unruly tendencies, and to focus on the agency and vitality of objects. 
 
To state that material things act and have agency is to notice and insist that they are also 
‘quasi agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own.’73  Matter, 
as Jane Bennett writes, is vibrant and full of ‘energetic vitality’.74  Things always have the 
capacity to exceed our understanding of them, to break free of their human-designated 
status,75 and in doing so, they ‘manifest traces of independence or aliveness’.76 
 
To claim that things, materials and objects have agency is to reject strict boundaries between 
natural and social actors and phenomena, human agents and passive things. As Michel Callon 
identified in his classic paper on the domestication of the fishermen and the scallops of St. 
Brieuc Bay, in seeking to understand the phenomena and relationships around us, we must 
take everything as uncertain, and subject our own disciplinary and personal preconceptions, 
indeed ourselves, to an equally rigorous and ‘agnostic’ process of enquiry.77  That process of 
enquiry must rest on symmetry of treatment, in that the roles of all actors and phenomena 
must be treated equally seriously: the observer follows the actors – human and non-human – 
with an open mind, to see how those actors (a scallop, a net, a sociologist) ‘build and explain 
their world.’78  And the enquiry must be committed to a principle of ‘free association’, that is, 
‘the abandonment of all a priori distinctions between the natural and the social.’79   
 
This methodology allows us to see that binary categories and a priori distinctions are 
themselves the result of a ‘pre-established grid of analysis’, rather than given, natural facts.80  
Or, as Bruno Latour argues, we should recognise that when we establish analytical categories, 
we engage in an act of ‘purification’ – that is, an attempt to create ‘distinct ontological zones’ 
with a sharp line drawn between the human on the one side, and the non-human on the 
other.81  Paying attention to objects as actors helps us to see that no such categorical purity 
exists outside the act of purification. 
 
Moreover, committing to a principle of symmetry in the way we study all entities, that is, 
insisting on a symmetrical frame of analysis, and on applying an equal vocabulary,82 breaks 
                                                 
71 Appadurai, ‘Introduction’ (n 37) 5.   
72 Arjun Appadurai ‘The Thing Itself’ (2006) 18 Public Culture 15, 15.   
73 Bennett (n 17) viii.   
74 Ibid 5. 
75 See for eg Bill Brown (n 13); Heidegger, (n 13)174 – 82.   
76 Bennett (n 17) at xvi.   
77 See Callon (n 11) 197 and more generally.   
78 ibid 201.   
79 ibid 196.   
80 ibid 201;  See also Latour and Woolgar (n 11), Latour, Reassembling the Social (n 10) 75 – 76. 
81 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (1993, Harvard UP) 10 – 11. 
82 Callon, (n 11) 200, 221 – 22. 
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down assumed hierarchies that place human beings at the pinnacle of agency.  This flattening 
is anti-hierarchical, and as such it can serve various important functions.   
 
First, as already mentioned, the insistence on symmetry itself requires us to peel away the 
doctrines, fictions, and convenient short-hands that we use to make sense of the world, but 
which also obscure it in significant ways.   To do this can make us look anew at what familiar 
things such as international law are, consider differently the ways in which they function as 
institutions, discourses and practices, and can help us to understand the work that material 
things do in international law, and further, in the world.  To concentrate on the Transnistrian 
border check point – a border made hyper-real by the presence of armed troops, the need to 
take only a clandestine photo, the flags and concrete barriers83 – is to throw into sharp relief 
the doctrine of the recognition of states in international law and to raise probing questions 
about the operation of that doctrine.  At the same time, it helps us to see the work that 
material objects do, either in calling into question, reinforcing, or some uneasy mix of the 
two, the relationship between the material world and the analytical categories we use to 
structure it. 
 
Second, the flattening that accompanies taking objects seriously as agents is political.  It 
places squarely on the agenda the question of why one entity is accorded status, rights, 
subjectivity, personhood, while another is treated as merely a thing, ripe for exploitation or 
commodification: consider the tree, the whale, the bodies/ballast of the transatlantic slave 
trade.84  It forces us to confront the question of where the difference lies, how the difference 
is constructed, and the role of international law in that making (and potential unmaking).  It 
also prompts us to ask how our political (and legal) concerns would change if we understood 
ourselves not as the sole agents at work in the world, but instead as but a part of a ‘vibrant 
materiality that runs alongside and inside humans’.85   
 
In fact, it is this capacity to make us look again at the received categories of object versus 
subject; inert thing versus human actor; analytical category versus natural fact; that is one of 
the most powerful aspects of these materially-alert methodologies which generally fly under 
the banner of Actor-Network-Theory.   
 
Reading objects as vital agents demonstrates that when Immi Tallgren writes that the 
déchiqueteuse – the papershredder - has ‘a past, perhaps even a life of its own, or at least a 
voracious appetite’86 she does not thoughtlessly take liberties with language, or 
anthropomorphise an inanimate object.  After all, as Latour has noted, when language gives 
actions to things, we should take it seriously,87 and as Bennett argues, a ‘touch of 
anthropomorphism’ can ‘catalyze’ us to move beyond our preconceptions.88  Instead, 
Tallgren’s vital déchiqueteuse helps us to consider the papershredder as itself one of the 
obscured actors of international law.  Working on and in the dingy backgrounds of 
international organisations and embassies, with a vibrant agency both of its own, and as part 
of the assemblage of human and non-human actors that make up the monde diplomatique 
which international law helps to structure. 
 
                                                 
83 See Finck, this vol. 
84 See Duvic-Paoli, Fitzmaurice, Buckner-Inniss, in this volume respectively. 
85 Bennett (n 17) viii. 
86 Tallgren, this volume  xx. 
87 See Latour Reassembling the Social (n 10) 71. 
88 Bennett (n 17) 99.  See also Jane Bennett, ‘Encounters with an Art-Thing’ 2015 3(3) Evental Aesthetics 101. 
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Can we attribute qualities of good and evil to the papershredder?  Or is it that, as Langdon 
Winner asks, ‘to discover either virtues or evils in aggregates of steel, plastic, transistors, 
integrated circuits, and chemicals seems just plain wrong, a way of mystifying human artifice 
and of avoiding the true sources, the human sources of freedom and oppression, justice and 
injustice.’?89  Engels, for one, recognised clearly that ‘the automatic machinery of a big 
factory is much more despotic than the small capitalists who employ workers ever have been’ 
requiring in order to function, a specific form of hierarchical organisation.90 He also noted 
that man may subjugate nature, but things will have their revenge: ‘the latter avenge 
themselves upon him by subjecting him, insofar as he employs them, to a veritable despotism 
independent of all social organisation.’91  The papershredder may not only be good or evil, it 
may be vengeful and despotic.  Of course, it may also, as Tallgren herself intimates, be a 
peace-bringing minister, a nurse smoothing the dying pillow, or wiping clean the brow of a 
troubled international law.92   
 
This sort of thinking suggests not only that an object has inherent characteristics, but that 
perhaps it has will or intentionality.  To return to our papershredder, does it have a will, as 
‘[d]ay and night, it eagerly crunches paper in the corridors of foreign ministries, in the 
cabinets of international organisations, in military headquarters, in the Vatican, at the ICRC, 
in the cellars of embassies.’93?   Such attribution has a long legal history. Here, we can draw 
on the concept of the ‘deodand’.94  Deodands were ‘accursed things’ both animate (a dog or 
ox for instance) and inanimate (a mill stone, a tree) that had caused death.95  These objects 
were not just hapless instruments in tragic situations, but caused death ‘with intent’96 and 
were punished accordingly.  Such a legal doctrine might seem almost comically archaic now, 
although it was only abolished in England in 1847, but the doctrine that the state may take 
legal action against an object itself, rather than the owner, because the object itself is the 
guilty party, persists.  As recently as 1974, the US Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture of a 
yacht, making explicit reference to the law of the deodand,97 and in the 1996 Bennis case, the 
same Court upheld the forfeiture of a car,98 which the lower court had made on the basis that 
the innocence of the owner was beside the point, as ‘the property subject to forfeiture was the 
evil sought to be remedied.’99 
 
                                                 
89 Winner (n 14) 122.   
90 Friedrich Engels, ‘On Authority’ in Robert C. Tucker, (ed) The Marx Engels Reader (2nd ed W.W. Norton, 
1978) 731.   
91 Engels Ibid 731.  But, in contradiction to Engels, see Karl Marx, Capital, Volume 1 as discussed in Winner (n 
14) 129 – 130.   
92 Tallgren x. 
93 Tallgren.   
94 See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, in Four Books, ‘Book 1, The Rights’, Ch 8, 
XVI.  See also Colin Dayan, The Law is a White Dog: How Legal Rituals Make and Unmake Persons 
(Princeton UP 2011) 127 – 28.   
95 See for eg Blackstone, Ibid, William Pietz ‘Death of the Deodand: Accursed Objects and the Money Value of 
Human Life (1997) 31 RES: Anthropology and Aesthetics 97; Dayan (n 94) 127; Walter W. Hyde, ‘The 
Prosecution and Punishment of Animals and Lifeless Things in the Middle Ages and Modern Times’ (1916) 64 
U Pennsylvania Law Review 696; Paul Schiff Berman ‘An Anthropological Approach to Modern Forfeiture 
Law: The Symbolic Function of Legal Actions Against Objects’ (1999) 11 Yale Journal of Law and the 
Humanities 1,esp Part II. 
96 Dayan (n 94)127.   
97 Calero-Toledo v Pearson Yacht Leasing, 416 US 663, 680-82 (1974) USSC. 
98 Bennis v Michgan 516 US 442 (1996) USSC. 
99 Michigan v Bennis 527 N.W.2d at 493-49. 
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Attributing will to objects may well seem childlike and naïve in the hard-nosed world of 
international law, where lawyers burn the midnight oil drafting hard-fought amendments to 
climate change protocols and advising governments on the legality of proposed foreign air 
strikes.  And attributing agency to objects can be problematic if and when it allows decision 
makers to disclaim responsibility: ‘it wasn’t me, it was the drone.’ ‘If carbon is the agent, 
then what has government policy got to do with it?’  But the question of whether things have 
politics, inherent characteristics of good or evil, democracy or despotism, or even will does 
prompt us to ask whether, ‘there might exist many metaphysical shades between full causality 
and sheer inexistence.’100  It also forces us to look again at the things, entities and humans to 
which we have attributed agency or personhood, and, asks us to re-evaluate, as Natasha 
Wheatley puts it, ‘the conceptual mechanisms’ through which new subjects can be ‘birthed’ 
into international law.101   
 
Asking this question opens up the possibility of deeper and more accurate understandings of 
how international law works in the world.  To take once more international law’s cardinal 
subject, the state, we can ask how this entity took on full personality, and remains the subject 
against which other entities – individuals, categories of humans (such as refugees), territories 
not quite reaching statehood – are measured and found incomplete or lacking.102  We might, 
further, consider how the state, in embodying this perfect personhood, is at the same time 
sapped of its vitality and left as a dead entity.  Wheatley argues that the state in international 
law is ‘the archetypal dead metaphor’ because we have become so inured to the lively 
illusions and sensuous forces that support that metaphor of personhood.103   Taking objects 
and their vital forces – their lives – as a serious starting point might enable us to reanimate 
our dead and breathe life into old bodies, whose existence has been sapped of vitality and 
whose once vibrant explanatory force now drags behind us like the chain of Marley’s 
Ghost.104       
 
Even if objects are in some sense alive – vital actants that are parts of assemblages and 
networks and demonstrate that human beings do not have a monopoly on action -  it is 
another thing altogether to give agency or vitality to international law as a whole.  Yet in 
many of our chapters, international law does appear to have, or is described as itself 
possessing, some kind of agency or will.   
 
In the chapter on Breton Road Signs, for instance, the author argues that questions about 
officially recognised language are ‘positioned as prior to, and outside the scope of, legal 
consideration. This precludes international law from recognising the political nature of 
language disputes, and engaging with the different injustices associated with language use in 
this context.’105  Or, in the case of opium I note that I have written: ‘international law 
structures opportunities for intervention through its own doctrines, obscuring power’s play 
behind the use of clear and objective rules.’106 
 
                                                 
100 Latour, Reassembling the Social (n 10) 72.   
101 Natasha Wheatley ‘Spectral Legal Personality in Interwar International Law: On New Ways of Not Being a 
State’ (2017) 35(3) Law and History Review 5.   
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid 13.  On the important role and capacity of metaphor to surprise, and to compel us to slow down our 
thinking, see Maks Del Mar, ‘Metaphor in International Law: Language, Imagination and Normative Inquiry’ 
(2017) 86 Nordic Journal of International Law 170 esp. 175 and 181.   
104 Charles Dickens , A Christmas Carol in Prose: Being A Ghost-Story of Christmas (Chapman and Hall 1843).   
105 Mowbray, this vol, X. 
106 Hohmann this volume X. 
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Does international law have an agency in precluding, or in structuring?  Or is there something 
about the structure of international law that precludes?  Or is it about the actors behind 
international law?  It is significant, and not accidental, that many authors in this volume 
speak of international law in this way.  To speak as if international law has a will and intent 
subjectifies and personifies international law– anthropomorphising it.  Yet we know that to 
do this simultaneously objectifies or reifies international law, as though it were a bounded 
entity that can be found out there in the world, with certain edges already established and 
confirmed.  This simultaneous objectification/subjectification can be problematic.  Still, 
considering international law as an assemblage, made up of agentive characters as diverse as 
‘clocks, queues, bicycles, badges, cell phones, internet portals, simultaneous translation, 
[and] NGO fact sheets’ among others,107 can help us to ask questions about how international 
law works, and even, what international law is.108  Where is its agency to be found?  What 
motivates it?  These questions may not, in the end, elide issues of responsibility, but may 
instead help us to see in new ways the structural frameworks within which decisions seem 
possible or impossible, and outcomes seem predetermined or, on the other hand, 







In the sections above, I have sketched out the ways that this edited volume helps to bring 
international law to life, through paying attention to the lives of objects. 
 
First, looking at international law through objects, whether the passport or a postcard from 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia,109 reminds us that international law is 
deeply implicated in people’s everyday lives.  Second, tracing the social lives and 
biographies of objects – such as ships’ ballast or the chicotte,110 helps us to reveal their secret 
lives and histories, both within and beyond international law.  Third, we can also, and 
perhaps most radically, see the vitality and agency of objects: a canoe, a gavel, as well as the 
hungry papershredder,111 seem themselves to come to life and to act in and on international 
law and legal relationships.  Thinking through objects can compel us to think through 
different metaphors and express ourselves in different idioms.  We free ourselves to imagine 
the world over different timescales and to inhabit different spaces with objects.  And, perhaps 
most importantly, we discipline ourselves to bring international law back to the concrete 
implications of the lived experience of it.  Throughout, tracing the lives of objects allows us – 
even forces us – to ask questions about agency, will and intention.  Who and what makes up 
international law, motivates or acts in service of it? In what way are objects and subjects 
mutually constituted?  Such an analysis also prompts us to raise important questions about 
how international law takes on its own life, what it is as an entity, and where its own agency 
might lie. 
 
                                                 
107 See Jane K. Cowan, ‘The Universal Periodic Review as a Public Audit Ritual: An Anthropological 
Perspective on Emerging Practices in the Global Governance of Human Rights’ in Hilary Charlesworth and 
Emma Larking (eds) Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and Ritualism (CUP 2015) 45.   
108 Ibid. 
109 See Julia Dehm, Sophie Rigney this vol, respectively.   
110 Buckner-Iniss and Martineau, respectively.   
111 Buchanan and Hewitt Treaty Canoe, Parker Gavel, Tallgren (n x). 
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The aim in bringing objects to life is to enliven international law, and enliven international 
lawyers.  By pushing at the edges of our discipline, and asking us to reconsider the way we 
categorise objects and subjects, the animate and the inanimate, the living and the non-living 
we can see international law in new ways.  In doing so, we can enliven old debates, and 
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